A federal judge dismissed a challenge from Mesa County Sheriff’s Office leaders last week to a Colorado law limiting public employees’ cooperation with immigration authorities, concluding that the plaintiffs did not allege they engage in any conduct that the law would prohibit.

In a July 17 order, U.S. District Court Judge Gordon P. Gallagher noted that lawmakers only forbade the sharing of personal information “for the purpose of” immigration enforcement. Even then, the law contains exceptions for authorized criminal investigations or necessary duties.

“The Court respects that Plaintiffs’ wish to ensure they understand, both for individual reasons and on behalf of the agencies they head or work for, the current bounds of the law vis-à-vis how they can and should work and communicate with other agencies — particularly federal law enforcement,” wrote Gallagher. Yet, as alleged, “Plaintiffs only intend to share information for permissible law enforcement purposes and disclaim any precluded purpose.”

In August 2025, Sheriff Todd Rowell, Undersheriff Matthew King, and Capt. Curtis Brammer sued the state over a recently enacted law known as Article 74. The law prohibits public employees from sharing personal identifying information “for the purpose of investigating for, participating in, cooperating with, or assisting in federal immigration enforcement.” The law also prevents employees from inquiring into a person’s immigration status “for the purpose of identifying if the person has complied with federal immigration laws.”

While people who violate the law are liable for a civil fine of up to $50,000, there are several caveats. Legislators clarified that Article 74 “is not intended to interfere with criminal investigations.” The law also does not prevent state or local authorities from cooperating with federal agencies, nor does it override other duties required by state or federal law.

The plaintiffs listed a variety of activities the sheriff’s office participates in with federal agencies:

• patrolling Interstate 70 for drug interdiction
• targeting people online who seek to have sex with children
• identifying and apprehending “high-profile repeat offenders”
• ensuring applicants for concealed carry permits are allowed to possess firearms under federal law
• transporting detainees between state and federal custody

The plaintiffs alleged Article 74 is unconstitutionally vague as to whether they would face liability for sharing personal identifying information in the course of those activities.

“Notably, it is not uncommon for federal agents or officers to serve multiple roles for multiple agencies, including for one of the immigration enforcement agencies,” their lawyers wrote. “Thus, Plaintiffs or other political subdivision employees may unknowingly disclose or ‘make available’ information to federal authorities acting in these dual roles. As written, the statute provides no constitutionally sufficient detail to inform a person of reasonable intelligence whether such activities do or do not violate the statute.”

The Colorado Attorney General’s Office sought to dismiss the case. It noted that one former Mesa County deputy who faced discipline for helping immigration agents arrest a college student had acted “solely for the purpose” of immigration enforcement.

“Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that they collect information only as required by state law or to perform their necessary duties, and similarly only share information with federal counterparts for criminal investigations or as required by law,” wrote the office. “They ‘regularly’ transmit personal identifying information (‘PII’), but only for ‘non-immigration purposes,’ conduct that is permitted under the challenged laws.”

Gallagher agreed that, as alleged, the plaintiffs’ conduct did not run afoul of Article 74.

“It only applies to intentional sharing of information for federal immigration purposes,” he wrote.

Gallagher, a Joe Biden appointee, acknowledged the plaintiffs’ concern about sharing information that could wind up in the hands of immigration agents in the course of routine investigations. However, he reiterated the caveats lawmakers had included.

“The notion that state law enforcement could provide information to a federal agency that is permitted for one purpose and verboten for another is not far-fetched,” Gallagher wrote. “Here, the statutory scheme and attendant safe harbor provisions are entirely hinged on the intent and purpose of the state law enforcement official providing the information and not what is done with the information received by a federal agency.”

The case is Rowell et al. v. Weiser et al.